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Finance and economic and social reproduction: prospects for financialised futures in
Portugal
João Rodrigues, Ana C. Santos, Nuno Teles
1. Introduction
This  paper  forms  part  of  a  collection  of  submissions  for  Task  6  of  WP11  on  finance  and
economic and social reproduction prepared by SOAS and CES. The main scope of this paper
is to reflect on the factors that have shaped economic and social reproduction in Portugal,
drawing on previous research examining the involvement of households with finance and
the systems of provision for housing, pensions and water conducted for WP5 and WP8 of
FESSUD.  This  is  one of  two papers  prepared by  CES on the future  of  financialisation.  The
first focused on the financialisation of the water sector in Portugal, and this one is a more
general paper which considers wider lessons based on the way in which finance has shaped
the provision of basic services in the country, including housing and pensions.
Previous research has shown that financialisation has transformed profoundly the
organisation of economic and social reproduction, with finance engaged in ever more areas
of economic and social life, and that these transformations are highly variegated in
implementation and outcomes across and within countries. Indeed, cross-country
comparative research for WP5 and WP8 has shown that the impacts of financialisation and
of the financial crisis depend on multiple factors and their interactions. They depend on
overall levels of economic and financial development, affecting most the weakest and
financially integrated economies exposed to financial turmoil. They depend on the
particular ways relevant systems of provision have become increasingly financialised and
more prone to reproduce and consolidate social inequalities. And they depend on recent
transformations of broader welfare provision, especially those that have pushed the most
vulnerable to the margins of evolving welfare models and their corresponding systems of
provision.  From  this  it  follows  that  the  ways  in  which  the  penetration  of  finance  into
economic and social reproduction will continue to evolve will vary too across and within
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countries;  and especially  so  in  the  wake of  the  Global  Financial  Crisis  (GFC)  that  has  had
highly differentiated impacts, producing further geographical and institutional variations.
This paper focuses on the future of finance in the provision of basic services in Portugal,
based on housing, pensions and water, drawing largely on the empirical material compiled
for FESSUD.1 The Portuguese case studies are brought to bear on the impacts of finance
and of financial crisis on a semi-peripheral country within the EU that has partially followed
similar processes as those of most financialised core countries, and that have been
particularly hard-hit by the GFC. The Portuguese case studies will thus help illuminate the
constraints on, and pressures for, continued expansion of finance that have become most
evident in the aftermath of the GFC. The paper thus provides a contrast to the UK where
financialisation has been most advanced, as examined in the SOAS papers.
Portugal, a semi-peripheral country within the EU, has to a certain extent followed similar
unequal financialisation processes as those of core countries, having become more
exposed to financial and economic crises, with more detrimental and widespread effects on
the economy and society. These effects have been particularly devastating due to the 2011-
14 external financial assistance agreement with the ‘Troika’ that has required severe
austerity measures, which have deepened and prolonged economic recession through their
direct and indirect effects on income, increasing unemployment and underemployment,
and the contraction of public services. Thus, if, on the one hand, there is significant
pressure on the state to continue correcting economic and social imbalances created by
finance, on the other hand, the state is highly constrained in conducting public policy,
having to continue to rely on the market and financialised solutions to fund much needed
social services and infrastructure.
Drawing on the Portuguese case studies on the penetration of private finance into housing,
pensions and water, the examination of future prospects for finance in the country will be
1 For financialisation in Portugal the paper draws on Rodrigues et al. (2016a), for housing it draws on Santos
et al. (2015), for pensions it draws on Rodrigues et al. (2016b) and for water on Teles (2016), which will not be
specifically referred to in the remainder of the paper.
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pursued by examining the particular ways in which finance has become a more pervasive
component in these three domains of social provision and the ways this penetration of
finance has been impacted by the GFC. Acknowledging the limits of foresight endeavours
(Bayliss and Fine, 2016), the underlying presuppositions guiding this foresight exercise is
that financialisation and the ensuing financial crisis have produced profound
transformations in economic and social structures and processes that condition the ways in
which the financial expansion may unfold in the future, which will be not mere replications
of past processes and outcomes; and that the future of finance is context specific, requiring
national and sectoral case studies.
The paper is organised into five parts. The next section briefly presents the main
characteristics of semi-peripheral financialisation of the Portuguese economy, setting the
background for the Portuguese case studies. The subsequent three sections look into
housing, pensions and water, identifying the factors that have shaped financialisation of
these systems of provision in recent years, and the prospects for their evolution given
present circumstances and constraints. The final section synthesises the main conclusions
of the foresight exercise constructing a vision of a future considering the implications of
continuing on the current trajectory.
2. The semi-peripheral financialisation of the Portuguese economy
Analysis of the content of financialisation on the Portuguese economy and society has
revealed a substantially differentiated experience of the recent rise of finance than that of
the Anglo-American world, an experience that has been conceptualised as a semi-
peripheral type of financialisation (Rodrigues et al., forthcoming). As will be explained
below, this is by and large shaped by structural features of the economy and the relatively
late ‘modernisation’ of the financial system in the 1990s, first, in the context of the
European integration process and, subsequently, the construction of the Economic and
Monetary Union.
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Indeed, the notion of semi-peripheral financialisation was forged having two closely-related
aspects in mind. First, it accounts for the intermediate position of the Portuguese economy
in  the  world  economy,  i.e.  as  an  industrialised  country  that  is  increasingly  unable  to
compete with countries with which it is most closely integrated, susceptible to stagnation
and crises alongside compensating growth of non-tradable sectors. Second, it refers to the
institutional features of its financial system, which shares characteristics of both core and
peripheral countries, being mostly shaped by the process of European integration and by
the predominance of bank loanable capital within the strict framework of the Euro. The
concept of semi-peripheral financialisation in the Portuguese context underlines the more
predominant and critical role of bank loanable capital in shaping recent changes in the
economy and society, emphasising the role of international finance and its intertwining with
domestic agents, including financial institutions, non-financial firms and households.
With its own colonial past, Portugal is, nonetheless, a semi-peripheral country within the
world economy, combining characteristics of both developed and developing countries and
being marked by late industrialisation and lasting backward economic development relative
to the core Northern and Central European countries. With its loss of colonies in the 1970s,
the country rapidly geared towards integration in the then European Economic Community
(EEC), formalised in 1986. New foreign direct investment, benefiting from structural EU
funds and lured by low wages, fuelled economic growth during the early years of
integration.
Portugal’s laggard position in the European context reinforced the role of the European
Union  in  driving  the  particular  levels  and  forms  taken  by  the  financialisation  of  the
Portuguese economy and society. The participation in the Eurozone, in particular, brought
particular unprecedentedly advantageous financial conditions, such as an almost unlimited
access to hard currency and bank loanable capital at low interest rates, usually unavailable
to countries at similar levels of development.
The financialisation of the Portuguese economy and society was a rapid, but effective,
process of socioeconomic transformation. Within the time-span of a decade, between the
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mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, the Portuguese financial system evolved from a state-
controlled and ‘repressed’ financial regime to become fully integrated and liberalised,
supported by a firm insertion in international circuits of finance. Despite the speed of these
transformations, the transition was smooth without the financial instability that frequently
accompanies such processes.2  The Portuguese case is even more remarkable when
considering the scope and depth of these transformations. The recent evolution of the (non-
financial) private sector testifies to the magnitude of these changes, progressing from a
very timid engagement with finance to skyrocketing levels of private indebtedness, the
main culprit for turning Portugal proportionately into one of the highest externally indebted
countries in the world.
In the early 1980s, major economic groups and banks were publicly owned. Interest rates
were set administratively, and credit was mostly directed towards the needs of the state
and of the associated public enterprises in strategic sectors; there were also strict controls
on  capital  flows,  and  the  exchange  rate  was  defined  using  a  sliding  scale  pegged  to  a
basket of foreign currencies. This configuration, locked-in by a socialist leaning
Constitution declaring nationalisations as ‘irreversible conquests of the working-class’,
was antithetical to the wider neoliberal international trends at the time with which Portugal
eventually aligned, albeit, as typical in the semi-periphery, with a time lag.
The combination of two IMF interventions (in 1979 and in 1983-85) and the preparation for
accession to the EEC set a favourable context for what has been uncritically labelled as the
‘modernisation’ of the Portuguese financial system from the mid-1980s onwards. The
privatisation and liberalisation of the financial sector, which put an end to credit limits and
administered interest rates, was the first set of factors contributing to the increase in bank
loans in the 1990s. A second set of factors is linked to the release of (poorly remunerated)
compulsory reserves deposited in the Bank of Portugal, which were subsequently
2 The ordered nature of the transition can be explained by the conjunction of a set of very favourable factors
including: the role of the state in planning and implementing these reforms, which were carefully phased out
even if within a short time; state support to the bank sector through a highly beneficial fiscal framework; the
presence of a strong public bank capable of intervening at convenient and trouble times (Caixa Geral de
Depósitos); and very low levels of private indebtedness (of non-financial firms and households), meaning the
presence of profitable and unexplored markets.
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transformed into public debt negotiable at market prices, and the gradual rise of
securitised public debt, traded on secondary markets and open to foreign investors.
Accession to the EEC, and ensuing integration into the European single market for goods
and services, implied liberalisation and harmonisation with the different segments and
practices in the European banking sector, for example, putting an end to the traditional
distinction between investment and commercial banking, abolishing restrictions on the
entry of new agents and aligning prudential requirements for the sector with the 1989
Basel Accords.
The removal of all national controls over the international circulation of capital, reflected in
the full convertibility of the escudo, was the culmination of the process of transformation of
the financial sector. It contributed to attracting foreign capital, helping to peg the exchange
rate of the escudo, and generating significant revenue from privatisations.  The changes in
the exchange rate policy meant the substitution of the goal of competitiveness with a
disinflationary target, in line with the strictures of the European Monetary System and the
Exchange Rate Mechanism, to which the country joined in the 1990s. With the active
participation of the state, this trajectory illustrates an active political commitment to a
process of integration increasingly guided by market forces and, in particular, by finance.
The processes of bank privatisation and financial liberalisation, which were basically
completed at the beginning of the 1990s, and the nominal convergence trajectory
culminating in adherence to the Euro – all contributing to the over-appreciation of the
escudo – were decisive factors in transforming the Portuguese economy into a financialised
one. Indeed, the official justifications and optimistic evaluations that underpinned the
strategy for joining the Euro explicitly underline the aim of expanding the financial sector,
perceived as being in the vanguard of ‘modernization’.3  The remarkable decrease of real
interest rates was then seen as the most relevant sign of the successful insertion of
national finance into international financial markets. The expectation was, on the one hand,
3 Naturally, as the case studies below show, financial modernization was appealing to other agents and
sectors as loans were made available to them, reinforcing elites being formed and strengthened within the
financial system.
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that it would allow firms to accelerate capital accumulation, taken as a pre-condition for
future increases in overall productivity; and, on the other hand, that it would favour
accumulation of wealth on the part of households, particularly through the purchase of
housing stock. From indebtedness levels below the European average in the mid-1990s,
Portuguese households and firms were geared to the top in the first decade of the Euro,
with levels similar only to the UK and Ireland.
The policy of nominal convergence, as part of the construction of the single European
currency, ultimately created conditions for future troubles. Portugal entered the Euro with
an over-appreciated exchange rate and with an already unbalanced economy. A huge
current account deficit started to mount, since the government could no longer rely on
devaluation to boost its exports and solve its balance of trade problems. The strong Euro
aggravated this problem further. In a context marked by continuing downward pressure on
prices, Portuguese firms, mostly price-takers when operating internationally, saw a
decrease in their profit margins. Incentives were thus geared towards the profitable non-
tradable sectors of the economy, less exposed to foreign competition – from construction to
retail  and  privatised  utilities.  The  banking  sector  played  a  pivotal  role  in  these  structural
transformations, channelling foreign credit, directly or indirectly (i.e. through households),
to  these  sectors.  This  has  meant  that  the  extraordinary  influx  of  capital,  even  if  at  a  low
cost,  did  not  result  in  positive  structural  transformations  in  the  tradable  sectors  of  the
economy. On the contrary, a decaying manufacturing tradable sector was progressively
substituted by construction and real estate. High external and unsustainable debt is thus
not so much related with the cost of capital per se but largely with the insertion of the
uncompetitive economy in the international arena and corresponding intertwining with
international finance.
To sum up, the context-specific nature of semi-peripheral financialisation of Portugal,
stemming by and large from the hybrid nature of the economy, combines elements of
relatively backward structures with a rapidly modernised financial sector fully articulated
with core financial centres. This has translated into the predominance of bank loanable
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capital from external sources, capital accumulation geared towards domestic non-tradable
sectors, rising levels of household debt, and a state overly-dependent on foreign funding,
resulting in high levels of external debt and prolonged economic stagnation even before the
crisis.
3. Prospects for financialised housing: foreign investors and segmented mortgage
markets
The expansion of bank loanable capital has had a tremendous impact on the housing
sector. It absorbed a great part of loans granted to business and households as real estate
lending has gone into the production of dwellings as well as their purchase.4
These transformations were also encouraged by EU banking regulations that favoured the
financing of homeownership through mortgages (considered the most secure form of credit
since they are based on a durable asset as collateral), and thereby the upstream activities
of construction and real estate. Continued public investment in infrastructures further
favoured these sectors. Even if the Maastricht fiscal criteria and the Stability Pact
constrained public investment, various financial engineering arrangements, such as the
creation of state-owned enterprises or Public Private Partnerships, allowed for disguising
public investment in infrastructure as public expenditure. This financial engineering,
primarily engendered by the banking sector, allowed for the rise of aggregate investment in
the 1990s, pulled by a housing and construction boom. Lax land regulation, associated with
incentives for local municipalities to approve construction, also favoured the construction
boom. Bank credit to construction and real estate activities grew from 10% to about 40% of
the entire business debt between 1992 and 2008, reflecting the move of domestic capital to
sectors relatively insulated from international competition in the new context of a strong
currency that penalised the tradable sectors such as manufacturing. The construction of
household dwellings rose dramatically, with the number of homes built per annum tripling
4 Between 1992 and 2008 bank credit to construction and real estate activities rose from 10% to 40% of entire
bank lending to non-financial firms; and between 1992 to 1999 bank loans to households surpassed bank
lending to non-financial corporations, growing from 45% to 115% (Rodrigues et al., forthcoming).
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from 40.000 in 1995 to 120.000 in 2002. However, this construction boom meant a
dysfunctional use of land and an oversupply of dwellings, with an extraordinary proportion
of vacant housing units (12.5% in 2011).
Banks not only financed the construction of family dwellings but also home purchases. The
traditional weakness of the Portuguese welfare state, conceding only a marginal role to
social housing (representing 3% of total housing stock of permanent residences in 2011),
together with a housing policy focused on the promotion of private ownership help to
explain the extraordinary rise of housing loans. Already prior to membership of the EEC,
ownership rates were high in EU terms, as state intervention favoured private forms of
provision. But the financialisation of the Portuguese economy ultimately provided the
conditions for the success of a policy model based on homeownership through the use of
credit, which from the second half of the 1990s onwards became cheap and plentiful. The
role of the central government in this process is evident. Between 1987 and 2011, 73% of
the government budget devoted to housing was spent on subsidies associated with loans
for permanent homeownership, 14% was used on rehousing programmes, 8% was used on
rent subsidies, and only 2% was spent on direct promotion of housing (IHRU, 2015a). State
support was thus relevant to ensure mortgage-led demand for new homes grew in tandem
with the rise of housing supply. The housing system of provision has thus accounted for a
large portion of households’ financial activities through mortgage markets, as a result of
unprecedented access by the Portuguese banking sector to European credit markets, as
noted above, making credit available to households at low interest rates, and the
specificities of the Portuguese housing system of provision that was by and large
dominated by private and commodified forms of provision.
Household debt grew from 35% of disposable household income in 1995 to reach its highest
value of 131% in 2009,5  declining since then and representing 118% of disposable
household income in 2013. This rise in household debt is easily identified with housing
loans, constituting the main portion of household bank debt that has risen from 70% in 1995
5 In this year, the average level of household debt for the 18 Euro countries was 98%.
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to 80% in 2009, which helps explain the rise in the proportion of property owners relative to
tenants, with homeownership representing 73% of accommodation in 2011, growing from
65% in 1991.
At the turn of the millennium, housing oversupply and the end of state support to mortgage
credit resulted in a slow burn crisis in the domestic construction sector, with very
asymmetric social and regional impacts. The 2008-09 crisis accentuated the sector
imbalances, with the decline of household disposable income and the rise of unemployment
rates leading to the rise of credit arrears, even if default rates of mortgage loans remained
at relatively low levels (3% in 2013); as well as the recent exodus from the country of young
unemployed individuals and couples. All this represented an important constraint on
continued expansion of finance in the housing sector from a demand side viewpoint.
Another type of constraint emerged from the concentration of mortgage debt on higher-
income households. In Portugal, mortgage markets have been a privilege of the middle to
upper classes, who have had eased access to this type of loans because they have enough
wealth for a deposit and collateral, having almost exclusively benefited from cheap
subsidised credit.6  The  extraordinary  expansion  of  household  debt  should  thus  be
understood as the easiest and cheapest way for the wealthier households to gain access to
housing. Departing from very low debt levels, the rise of indebtedness was not only
generally  sustainable  in  respect  of  a  household’s  ability  to  pay,  but  was  also  a  relatively
safe way to accumulate wealth, despite the drop in housing prices in recent years. With
most of these mortgages contracted at variable rates indexed to the interbank rate Euribor,
monthly repayment amounts have followed the decline of ECB interest rates since 2009,
allowing for a significant reduction in levels of mortgage loan repayments, in contrast to
the general rise of rents due to the liberalisation of the rental market.7  Low income
6 This has also contributed to the relatively smooth and undisturbed financial expansion, as mentioned above,
as well as to the more moderate impact of the crisis on the Portuguese housing sector, which did not
experience the dramatic consequences of the housing bubbles of the USA or Spain.
7 For example, between 2001 and 2011 the monthly value of acquired homes rose 36% while the monthly
cost of rented accommodation rose 91%.
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households, excluded from homeownership and social housing, have faced increasingly
higher housing costs, resulting in the escalation of inequalities in access to housing.
In the aftermath of the GFC, the expansion of mortgage markets slowed down and access
has become more exclusive, with borrowers expected to put down larger deposits, and
lenders seeking more stringent evidence of ability to make repayments, including close
scrutiny of the income, and even the spending habits, of prospective borrowers.  All this has
served to increase mortgage market segmentation. The current economic situation,
marked by stagnation, high levels of unemployment among the youth, precarious labour
relations and low wage income, further contributed to skewing mortgage markets towards
the well-off accentuating its inequality-inducing effects, providing further evidence for the
exhaustion of a model based on financialised private provision of housing.
The dysfunctions of the Portuguese housing system are acknowledged by public
authorities. The public institute responsible for implementing housing policy in Portugal,
the Instituto da Habitação e da Reabilitação Urbana (Institute for Housing and Urban
Rehabilitation), has noted the paradoxical situation of the Portuguese housing sector, with
the co-existence “[o]n the one hand [a] high number of empty homes, [and] on the other
difficulties experienced by families in finding housing that is adequate to their means and
needs” (IHRU, 2015b: 6). It also acknowledges that the housing problem in Portugal results
from the “[t]he politics of promoting and financing the acquisition of private housing”, which
“ended up having a perverse effect in price increases and contributed to the accumulation
of very high levels of debt by the state, the banking sector, companies and households”. The
overall assessment of a public policy devoted to the promotion of homeownerships is that
“[r]elated public and private investment … neither contributed nor enabled familial access
to housing” (p. 11). These politics promoted instead “the expansion of urban peripheries, in
many cases segregated and in poor conditions, they generated vast surfaces of ‘artificial
land’, added home-to-work commutes and exponentially increased energy consumption for
transportation. In the case of historic centres, these policies increased local costs,
promoting only very costly building rehabilitation projects” (p. 11).
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This has meant that in Portugal, one of the most severely hit EU countries by the financial
crisis, the rental market has become the only viable alternative for those unable to own a
home. Fiscal incentives to promote private homeownership through mortgages are no
longer a possibility for the highly-indebted Portuguese state. Public debt reaching record
highs, a shaky banking sector requiring constant assistance from public authorities, and an
impoverished middle-class, together dictate the end of a housing policy based on loans for
homeownership. Under the new circumstances, house rental has become the main
alternative for both families looking for a home and for promoters who need to sell their
properties. Again, this is bluntly recognised by public entities with responsibility for housing
policy such as IHRU (2015b: 20).
Regional imbalances have been another consequence of financialised housing that creates
its own constraints for finance’s expansion. In Portugal, this has been manifested in the
growing  divergence  of  urban  coastal  areas  vis-à-vis  the  rural  mainland  parts  of  the
country; with the former more vulnerable to global and systemic pressures, and the latter
enduring economic decay, population decline, accentuating problems of economic, social
and territorial cohesion.
In the context of savings glut searching for yield, real estate has also become a more
attractive destination for foreign capital. That is, the GFC has rendered urban space and
touristic areas an ever more attractive destination for investment, contributing to the
escalation of house prices in those regions, further pushing the transmutation of housing
into a financial asset, creating new forms of economic, social and territorial disruption.
And this is by and large externally driven. Policies conducted to deal with the financial
crisis, namely the large scale programme of quantitative easing carried out by the ECB to
ensure that interest rates remained at very low levels, has had the effect of reducing yields
on government bonds, bank deposits and pension annuities, raising the relative
attractiveness of investment in housing, and in residential lettings in particular. Many
capital cities have since received a substantial amount of foreign investment, from wealthy
individuals and institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies,
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reflecting the role of housing as a ‘safe haven’ from continuing financial turbulence and
political uncertainties and turmoil elsewhere in the world.
This is visible in the two major urban centres of the country, Lisbon and Oporto, and also in
the country’s tourist region of the Algarve. For example, in Lisbon, in the first trimester of
2016, foreign investment represented 20% of residential transactions, with a predominance
of French (26%), British (18%) and Chinese (13%) buyers.8
This provides yet one more illustration of how external factors are combined with particular
national and local interests, where central and local governments are not merely passive
agents. Quite the contrary, under a stagnated domestic market, both central and local
governments have actively promoted foreign investment in real estate, for example
facilitating residency permits in exchange for the purchase of expensive properties (i.e.
Gold Visas), by participating in international tourism and real estate fairs (e.g. Portuguese
Real Estate and Tourism Exhibition in Paris in 2016), or by conceding important fiscal
incentives to foreign investment, namely reductions or temporary exemptions from
municipal tax. As suggested above, these incentives have been effective. Carlos Vinhas
Pereira, President of the Franco-Portuguese Chamber of Trade and Manufacturing, and
focusing on the French interest in the Portuguese real estate, underlines the following
points of attraction: “security, purchasing power 20 to 25 per cent higher in Portugal,
climate, quality of life, easy transportation with 330 weekly flights from 23 French cities,
culture and gastronomy, and, in the end, the fiscal component”.9
This is a trend likely to continue in the present low interest rate environment and the
financial  and  political  turbulence  in  many  parts  of  the  world.  It  is  also  likely  that  it  will
attract small domestic investors due to a more acute aversion to risky investments in the
aftermath of the crisis and exposure of bankruptcies and scandals across the economy, as
well as the generally low rates of the relatively safer bank deposits and pension annuities,
8 https://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/fanceses-lideram-compras-de-imobiliario-portugues-superando-
ingleses-e-chineses-1732517
9 https://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/governo-acena-com-vantagens-fiscais-a-investidores-franceses-
1732591
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in  addition  to  reforms  to  the  state  pension  system  that  have  served  to  highlight  the
potential attractions of rental housing as a form of building savings for retirement (cf.
pensions section below).
That real estate has also become an attractive investment for foreign idle capital looking
for both safety and yield is a somewhat novel development. However, the transformation of
the real estate into a financial asset has the opposite effect of making housing more
vulnerable to speculative pressures, jeopardizing the goal of safety that motivated
investment in the real estate in the first place. The qualitative transformation entailed by
the gradual substitution of domestic ownership by foreign investment on the real estate of
capital cities is thus another consequence of financialised housing with potential dramatic
economic, social and territorial impacts. Some of these are already visible in Lisbon, with
landlords increasingly substituting long-term tenancies for locals with short-term rentals
for tourists, gradually expelling the former from the city centres as they can no longer find
affordable rents. Between 2012 and 2015 the price of houses in Lisbon rose 22%, much
higher than the national average of 5%, which is explained precisely by the purchase of
houses for tourism, namely for short-term rental.10  This  is  bringing  radical
transformations  in  the  city,  replacing  an  already  highly  pressured  residential  area  by
hotels, hostels, restaurants, bars, shops and other tourist-related services.
To summarize, the financialisation of housing has accentuated severe dysfunctions in the
Portuguese housing system of provision, including the coexistence of oversupply and
shortage of homes in the city centres of major urban areas, a highly segmented mortgage
market, an insufficient rental market, marginal non-commodified forms of housing
provision, economic decay in rural areas, and intense pressure on big urban centres. These
dysfunctions constitute obstacles to the continued expansion of finance based on bank
loans in the semi-peripheral Portugal, signalling the emergence of a more limited form of
financial expansion, based on foreign capital and targeting particularly safe and profitable
markets as opposed to productive investment.
10 https://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/preco-das-casas-em-lisboa-subiu-22-em-tres-anos-1732773
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4. Prospects for financialised pensions: foreign financial institutions and limited
private pension markets
While housing has been the preferred conduit through which (a segmented part of)
households have increasingly participated in debt markets, pensions have been
increasingly responsible for household participation in financial asset markets in EU
countries (Santos and Teles, 2014). Portugal is no exception. However, household
involvement with finance has been mainly dominated by the acquisition of financial
liabilities rather than financial assets, a difference that is partly explained by the
specificities of the housing and pensions systems of provision. While housing provision has
been almost the exclusive domain of the private sector, and at times substantially
supported by the state, the pensions system of provision is mainly public and based on the
pay-as-you-go principle, with a still limited presence of private-funded pension schemes,
which are the archetype of financialisation within this realm of social provision.
The Portuguese social security system was formally established in 1984, under the
Framework Law on Social Security, betraying the late institutionalisation of a social
protection system in the country and going against the neoliberal trends emerging at the
time at the international level, and also in other very relevant domestic areas. The public
old-age pensions system, in particular, is an obligatory protection system based on a pay-
as-you-go rationale with defined benefits, which comprises a general scheme for workers
in the private sector and a specific scheme that is a little more generous for public sector
workers known as the Caixa Geral de Aposentações (Civil Service Pension Fund). Overall,
this means that current pension payments are financed by contributions from workers and
employers in the contributory scheme, and by transfers from the state budget in the non-
contributory scheme for those who had not had the opportunity to make contributions. The
system thus functions on the basis of intra- and inter-generational social solidarity.
This belated construction of the Portuguese social protection system has represented a
slow maturation and convergence with the EU, in line with other countries in Southern
Europe, with spending on social protection rising from 8.5% of the GDP in 1986, when
18
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
Portugal joined the EEC, to 17% on the eve of the financial crisis in 2007. However, a gap
still separates the country from the Eurozone average with regard to per capita spending
on benefits, which amounts to approximately 64% of that average. Specifically with regard
to pensions as a whole, the number of pensioners in Portugal, standing at slightly over
600.000 on the eve of 25 April 1974, had quadrupled by the beginning of the new
millennium. This was in part due to the inclusion of a growing number of beneficiaries
within the universal public system, but above all because of demographic trends associated
with  an  ageing  population,  given  that  old-age  pensions  are  by  far  the  most  significant
component. It is therefore not surprising that spending on pensions, which in 1973
amounted to no more than 1% of the GDP (comprising approximately 25% of the
expenditure on the social security system), rose to 4% of the GDP in 1980 (representing
60% of total spending on social security), 5% of the GDP in 1990, and over 6% in the new
millennium (exceeding 60% of total spending on social security).
Despite the growth dynamic associated with spending on pensions, the average value of
pensions has remained low, reflecting the dominant economic model of low wages. At the
beginning of the 1990s over 90% of elderly people were receiving pensions that were lower
than the national minimum wage (which was and still is very low, e.g. 200 euro per month in
1991, 334 euro in 2001, and 530 euro in 2016). Due to economic growth and development in
the 1990s and longer working lives associated with higher wages and contributions, new
pensioners began to retire with increasingly higher pensions, which translated into a
reduction in the number of those whose pensions fell below the national minimum wage.
Even so, in the new millennium almost 80% of pensioners were receiving pensions that
were lower than this, indicating persistently low pensions despite these positive, but
limited, developments.
Notwithstanding the low level of pensions and the existence, until very recently, of a
surplus of contributions in relation to spending on contributory schemes,11  the  system is
seen as being threatened by demographic trends that need to be addressed. European
11 In fact, this situation only changed as a result of falling employment rates in recent years.
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integration has contributed to this perception with European institutions increasingly
stressing the imperative of balanced public finances.
Indeed, the public pension system has been subject to ongoing revisions over time. In 1993,
the value of old-age pensions actually improved when the pension formulae took inflation
into account with the introduction of a consumer price index. However, in a system that was
progressing towards maturity, certain rationalisation measures were also introduced.
These included the gradual equalisation of the retirement age for women and men by
raising the former, the extension of the eligibility period (i.e. the number of contribution
years) for accessing to old age pensions from 10 to 15 years, and the extension of the
contribution period used to calculate pensions, from the best ten years to the final fifteen
years.
In 2000 a new Framework Law on Social Security enshrined the principle that the
calculation of pensions should consider contributions as a whole rather than the last fifteen
years, which was later established by a Decree-Law in 2002 that included a transition
period from 2002 to 2016. This was a highly important parametric change designed to
reduce  the  value  of  pensions  and  marked  the  beginning  of  the  new  millennium  as  a
moment of change in the rationale of the system, one that aimed at tying pensions more
closely to earnings from working life, implying further removing them from current
incomes in society at the point of retirement.
Based on strictly financial criteria aligned with European priorities for public finance, and
European institutions’ diagnoses and recommendations for pension provision, within the
so-called open method of coordination, a form of European soft power, the 2007
Framework Law, introduced major changes into the formula for calculating pensions,
which imply substantial reductions in benefits. These included: (1) the introduction of a
“sustainability factor” that reduced pensions in line with increased life expectancy; (2)
accelerating the transition period to the full adoption of the whole contribution period; and
(3) de-indexation of pensions to the minimum salary by creating a “Social Support Index”
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which only guaranteed the purchasing power of the lowest pensions, whereas preserving
the real value of the remainder now depends on specific levels of economic growth.
Based on the 2007 reform, the European Commission (2012) predicts that Portugal is one of
the EU countries in which spending on pensions will increase least between 2010 and 2060
(0.2%), allowing placing pensions, as a percentage of GDP, in line with the average by 2060.
Naturally, this implies a clear sacrifice in the standard of living of pensioners since it is
associated with a sharp decline in the replacement rate of pensions from almost 90% to
53%,  becoming  one  of  the  lowest  in  the  EU,  producing  a  growing  inequality  between  the
incomes of pensioners dependent on public provision and the incomes of the rest of society.
This signals the transformation of pensions into one of the adjustment variables in the
economy, which has accentuated with the economic crisis from 2008 onwards and the
harsh austerity measures included in the framework of the Memorandum signed with the
Troika in 2011 that have specifically targeted pensioners’ income.
These changes, together with a permanent legitimising discourse focussing on the
impending structural threat to pensions, are fuelling a growing mistrust of the state
system. An opportunity has therefore been created for the private schemes to prosper
amongst the wealthier and more politically influential sectors of Portuguese society.
Given the tardy set up and the time taken to consolidate the social security system, after
the 1984 Framework Law on Social Security, the emergence of private forms of
provisioning retirement income, through pension funds and life insurance, is first and
foremost an outcome of developments within the financial sector itself, as discussed above.
They were first created in 1985, through Decree-Law No. 325/85, being at the time
restricted to funds managed by insurance companies (“life insurance” branches). Its scope
was soon extended in 1986, when pension fund management companies emerged. In 1989
pension savings plans (PPRs, Planos de Poupança Reforma) and the associated retirement
savings funds appeared, promoted by the state via fiscal incentives which took the form of
deductions from personal income tax (IRS) in the case of the former, and exemption from
corporation tax (IRC) for the latter. Although the initial growth was spectacular – 149
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pension fund management companies were created between 1987 and 1988 – the
regulatory limits placed on their management were very restrictive at the time, for example
requiring funds to hold at least 50% of their assets in public sector debt securities.
The growth in the pension funds sector in Portugal occurred in the 1990s, and this growth
was by and large driven by the privatisation of large companies and, above all, of banks that
created their own pension funds, the latter holding 57% of all pension fund assets in 1998.
The overwhelming majority of these private pension schemes consisted of defined benefit
funds resulting from collective agreements with workers which aimed to replicate the
rationale of the pay-as-you-go social security system, although they were different in
nature since they involved funded schemes and hence were dependent on the financial
markets. Pension funds grew exponentially in the decade reaching a total of around 10.000
million euros in 1998 (12% of GDP). Benefitting from growth in specific economic sectors, in
particular banking, these funds were also favoured by the climate of financial euphoria in
the second half of the 1990s, which boosted capitalisation – the effective average annual
rate of return in this period was 8.5%. Although they benefited from tax concessions, the
voluntary PPR schemes in the legal form of pensions funds, made a much more modest
contribution in this context, comprising only 5% of funds in 1998.
In the new millennium the growth rate of these funds declined, with a sharp fall after 2010.
Nowadays the funds do not even amount to 10% of GDP. This fall is primarily explained by
the transfer of funds from the banking sector to social security. In a context of stagnation,
the crisis in the capital markets and the reduction in the number of workers in the sector,
the banks transferred their future (defined benefits) employee responsibilities to the state,
providing the latter with a short-term financial reinforcement that enabled reducing the
budget deficit. This very tellingly revealed the failure of a private, defined benefits
capitalisation model whose associated future costs rendered it unattractive to the
Portuguese banking sector. Nevertheless, a few banks still remain the main holders of
pensions funds, in particular the BCP (through the Pensõesgere fund), the Caixa Geral de
Depósitos (CGD pensions) and BPI (life insurance and pensions), where almost two-thirds
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of the market is concentrated, largely replicating the current oligopoly in the Portuguese
banking market.
Although pension funds in Portugal do not appear to have been able to withstand a decade
of economic stagnation followed by crisis, this does not imply any decline in the importance
of savings products destined for retirement. In fact, in addition to pension funds (and PPRs
in the legal form of pensions funds which are of marginal significance), there has been a
marked growth in PPRs offered by insurance companies, which nowadays have
considerable weight in the national economy. These products, usually benefiting from
guaranteed capital and a minimum rate of return, are actually investment funds, albeit with
a low-risk profile. Unlike the aforementioned pension funds, the PPRs offered by insurance
companies do not provide defined benefits; they offer instead the capitalised value of the
financial application at retirement. The value of the PPRs has increased exponentially from
2.000 million euros to 12.111 million euros between 1998 and 2013, an evolution that was
again actively promoted by the state through significant concessions in the form of tax
exemption for individual investors, contributing as well to their implicit returns.
Despite claims that they are an efficient mechanism for mobilising and allocating capital,
the growth of PPRs has resulted in a remarkable channelling of capital outside the country,
particularly to other EU countries. Indeed, in 2007, prior to the international financial crisis,
64.5% of the insurance companies’ investments in PPRs were applied in the EU, with only
14% in Portugal. Although this may be explained by the narrowness of the financial markets
in a semi-peripheral economy such as Portugal, the negative effect on the Portuguese
economy is undeniable, since these investments represent a transfer of financial resources
outside the country. Moreover, in contributing towards lower economic growth, lower
employment and fewer contributions to the social security system, they ultimately have a
detrimental impact on the sustainability of this system.
Although the PPR market is concentrated within insurance companies, this should not
mask the influence of banking on this market, given that the main insurance companies
belong to banking institutions. Fidelidade, the biggest insurance company with a 31% share
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of the market, belonged to the Caixa Geral de Depósitos bank until it was privatised in 2014,
and has since been controlled by Chinese capital (via Fosun). The second largest, Ocidental
Seguros, with 20% of the market, belongs to BCP and the international insurance company,
Ageas. The companies ranked third and fourth belong to the former BES bank
(Tranquilidade, nowadays controlled by the US private equity fund Apollo), and the BPI
bank, with Allianz.
Finally, it should be noted that the state social security system has also not been immune
to the idea of capitalisation. The Social Security Financial Stabilisation Fund (Fundo de
Estabilização Financeira da Segurança Social, FEFSS), created in 1989 with an initial
allocation of 216 million Euros, illustrates this well. Like the state pension funds, the
FEFSS has also sought to copy the investment strategy of the private funds, whose finances
are the result of transferring two to four percentage points of contributions from salaried
workers. The portfolio of this fund has expanded steadily over the past twenty years,
totalling 11.700 million Euros in 2013, equivalent to 7.1% of the GDP and approximately 13
months of the Portuguese state’s current expenditure on pensions. However, the
investment rules for this fund are considerably more restrictive than those applied to
private funds, requiring a minimum investment in the Portuguese state debt.
At present, a stagnant economy marked by high levels of inequality hinders the possibilities
of expanding the financialisation of pensions. Similar to the prospects for financialised
housing, in the aftermath of the GFC, the current economic situation, marked by stagnation
and gloomy perspectives resulting from a high level of state debt to be paid off over the
next two decades, the high levels of unemployment among the youth, precarious labour
relations and low wage income, hinder the expansion of finance in this realm of social
provision.
From  this  it  follows  that  the  continuing  erosion  of  the  value  of  pensions  within  the  state
system will hardly be compensated by private provision. Only the wealthier will be able to
partly complement retirement income through private means. Increasing segments of the
retired  population  will  face  a  substantial  reduction  in  their  living  standards  with  the
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reinforcement of the link between contributions made during working life and future
pensions, within a context of high unemployment rates and an increasingly precarious
labour market. Even those who will be able to subscribe to voluntary private schemes will
find it difficult to secure living standards equivalent to those previously offered by the public
system. The pensions provided by private-funded pension schemes depend on the return
from the capital invested which, given the continuing instability, will be dubious, both from
an individual and a collective point of view.
To summarise, in Portugal, the construction and subsequent erosion of the state pension
system has been accompanied by the slow growth of private pension schemes. Portugal
thus occupies a modest position in terms of the importance of pension funds in relation to
wealth generated, with assets controlled by these funds representing 8.8% of GDP in 2012,
in comparison with an OECD average of 35.5%. Private-funded schemes play only a minor
role in the Portuguese pensions system, with low levels of take-up and relatively mediocre
returns. This is partly explained by the late development of the state pension system and
against the neoliberal influence at the time, and the semi-peripheral nature of the country
with a relatively immature capital market and low levels of household disposable income.
The gradual privatisation of the system has been relevant only for a small, wealthy segment
of the household sector. In the aftermath of the GFC there is little room for channelling
almost non-existent savings to capital markets while the state is financially drained and
unable to sponsor such schemes on a large scale. Financial institutions, particularly
insurance companies, nowadays belonging to foreign capital, but capture a small and
lucrative market, which has become yet another mechanism for exporting capital to the
European core. Similar to housing, and exposing the semi-peripheral condition of the
country, the expansion of finance in the Portuguese pension system of provision faces
severe obstacles pointing towards a different and more limited form of financial expansion,
increasingly involving foreign financial institutions and targeting an ever more segmented
market. At the same time, particular socioeconomic groups, such as women that generally
have shorter and lower paid working careers, will receive diminished and insufficient
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pensions resulting from the tightening of the link between contributions paid into the public
system and benefits paid out.
5. Prospects for financialised water provision: foreign capital and cherry-picking
The recent evolution of water provision is also shaped by the semi-peripheral nature of the
financialisation of the Portuguese economy and society in the context of the process of
European integration, which was largely marked by the easy access to foreign capital loans.
In the 1980s, the sector was marked by considerable investment by public entities in the
improvement of what were then taken as highly deficient water and waste systems, for
which local councils were mainly responsible. The more significant transformations in the
sector occurred in the 1990s when it was reorganised. Following EU guidelines, three
major institutional transformations were introduced: the corporatisation of the public
sector; the introduction of private enterprise practices in water management, which aimed
to bring in cost recovery in water bills; and private capital investment. These changes were
justified by the need to enhance investment to upgrade the different water provision
systems across the country, which still had important deficiencies in the early 1990s,
requiring large capital loans from external sources.
Corporatisation involved the deverticalisation of water provision systems, separating the
(capital-intensive) bulk sector (caption, treatment and storage of water) and the retail
sector (storage and final distribution). The retail sector remained in the hands of local
municipalities, which held the power to fix and charge tariffs to domestic users.
The bulk sector was regionally integrated into 19 multi-municipal companies with
municipalities keeping a 49% share. The control of the sector was transferred to the newly-
created public holding “Águas de Portugal (AdP)” that retained a 51% share in each of
these new companies. Corporatisation of the sector, through the creation of these new
public companies, was understood as a way to enhance efficiency, since professional
management was considered to be less permeable to political pressures than public
management directly subjected to political power. Moreover, the introduction of the
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corporate management model was also motivated by the need for convergence with
European rules to meet the conditions for accessing investment subsidies from the then
European Economic Community (EEC), and loans from the European Investment Bank.
Given the municipal control of water provision, the transfer of power to AdP had to be
agreed voluntarily by municipalities. Allured by the promise of new investment in the
capital-intensive bulk sector, without incurring further costs, most municipalities accepted
this new architecture. Today, these companies cover around 71% and 67% of the population
in bulk water supply and in bulk wastewater management, respectively. Municipalities that
refused at the time to participate in this process cover the rest of the population.
The retail sector did not escape the move to corporatisation. Various municipal companies
were created then with the single purpose of managing retail provision of water and
wastewater treatment. While most of these companies retained public ownership being
owned by the local municipality, several municipal companies were created in partnership
with private capital holding a minority share. These led to the gradual involvement of
national construction companies as private partners which, in many cases, benefitted
directly and indirectly from contracts with these municipal companies. But the most
significant change at the retail level, introduced from 1993 onwards, was the entry of
private capital through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in municipal concessions.
Coinciding with the expansion of water multinationals across the world, a small number of
municipalities covering large populations conceded their retail systems to multinational
companies, such as Veolia, for extended periods. Again, the expectation was that this would
allow new investment financed from sources other than municipal budgets.
The introduction of private enterprise management practices in the provision of water was
enforced through the creation of a regulatory agency for the sector (also encompassing
solid waste management). First established, in 1995, as Supervisory Commission for
Concessions, the scope of the regulatory agency has expanded with its institutional
evolution, becoming, in 2009, as The Water and Waste Services Regulation Authority
(ERSAR), the regulation authority for the entire water and waste sector. As a regulatory
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body, the ERSAR mandate presently rests on the principle that a natural monopoly ought to
be regulated to ensure the adequate protection of consumers. But it is also deeply
concerned with the elusive goal of market efficiency. While ERSAR clearly endorse as its
mission “to ensure adequate protection of consumers (…) by promoting the quality of the
service provided by the operators and guaranteeing socially acceptable pricing”, at the
same time it emphatically stresses the need of safeguarding “the financial viability and best
interests of the operators, irrespective of their status” (ERSAR, 2012: 17).  This concern is
explicitly conveyed in its endorsement of the total cost recovery principle in the calculation
of the prices of water and wastewater services, and the recommended targets for the
return on capital on these investments of about 5-10%, which were legally established from
the mid-1990s and based on the 10-year government bond market rate to which is added a
“risk premium” of 3%.
The massive entry of private capital was another hallmark of the evolution of the sector in
the 1990s. European grants and abundant foreign credit available (from the European
Investment Bank, domestic banks and foreign bonds) funded an impressive evolution of
investment in the water and wastewater systems. Coverage of water supply and
wastewater improved, particularly in treated wastewater, with coverage rising from 25% in
the mid-1990s to 75% at the end of the 2000s. The expansion of coverage was followed by
an impressive improvement in the quality of water supply, and also significant progress in
the treatment of river basins and coastal waters.
Annual investment in the sector continued to grow extensively in the 2000s, from 364.5
million euros in 1999 to almost 1400 million euros in 2010 (nominal terms). In the bulk
sector, debt increased from 438 million euros in 2003 to 2.470 million in 2012 (representing
about 39% of the sector assets). In the retail sector, including also retail waste treatment,
debt rose from 119 million euros in 2003 to 552 million euros in 2012 (representing about
55% of the sector assets).
With  the  state  being  constrained  by  EU  Stability  Pact’s  deficit  limits,  the  scale  of  the
investments was only achieved with both EU transfers and the resort to (mainly foreign)
28
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
debt, to which Portuguese agents had privileged access from the beginning of the 1990s
until the 2011 Eurozone crisis, as mentioned above. Thus, the recent evolution of the water
sector was also by and large determined by the participation in the EMU that allowed the
Portuguese economy to benefit from new and unconstrained access to capital at
historically low interest rates in international (European) markets. The country’s semi-
peripheral position, with over-appreciated real exchange rate within the Euro Zone, was
beneficial to the agents operating in the water and connected sectors, such as construction
companies, that were relatively more protected than the rest of the economy from external
competitiveness.
AdP, with its corporate structure, was of pivotal importance, channelling most of its
external funding to the regional bulk companies that it controls and that operate in bulk
water supply and wastewater sectors. The scale of AdP enabled it to acquire financial
know-how in domestic and foreign financial markets, having had access to three different
funding sources: European subsidies, long-term debt (mainly coming from the European
Investment Bank (EIB) and bond issuance); and short-term loans from the banking sector.
Debt grew from 744 million euros in 2003 to 3.000 million euros in 2013 in nominal terms.
About 60% of this debt consisted of EIB loans with long maturities and low interest rates,
whose relative importance as a funding source rose from the beginning of the 2000s.
Private banking debt, accounting for about 20% of total debt in 2013, refers to loans both
from major foreign banks, such as Deutsche Bank and DEXIA, and domestic ones, such as
BPI. AdP also resorted to bond markets, issuing bonds of around 600 million euros to a very
small number of foreign investors during the 2000s in order to match their long-term
investment with long-term debt. The success of these bond market operations was attested
by the low interest rates charged (amounting to 1.8% in 2013), showing both the scale
achieved by AdP as a company and its deep involvement with international finance. Finally,
the financial sophistication of AdP and its financialised profile is also clearly attested by the
volume of interest rate and exchange rate SWAP derivatives, most of which aimed to
protect against interest rate volatility.
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The scale of much need investment helps understand why such far-reaching institutional
transformations (corporatisation and transfer of responsibilities from local municipalities,
private capital involvement, and new regulatory framework) did not face much popular
resistance during the 1990s and early 2000s. These transformations coincided with
extraordinary progress in the provision of water and wastewater and the relatively
contained growth of the tariffs set by municipalities.  Nonetheless, the increasing role of
finance in water provision – through debt that funded most of the new investment – set the
scene for a new stage where the relation between finance and domestic consumers
became increasingly tightened. Rising financial costs associated with rising debt ultimately
legitimised enhanced regulatory powers to enforce the cost recovery principle, which has
meant the streaming of income from households to finance through tariffs have risen
considerably and above inflation in the past decade. The financialised character of water
provision in Portugal thus became apparent since water bills increasingly came to reflect
financial costs and the rising influence of the financial sector in water provision. In line with
increased investment and output, overall annual costs have significantly increased in bulk
sector concessionaires, from 258 million euro in 2002 to 572 million euro in 2012, with
financial costs played a significant part in this evolution, having gone from 15 million euro
in 2002 to 106 million euro in 2012, resulting from the combined effect of rising debt levels
and the rise in interest rates (from 3.3% in 2002 to 4.2% in 2012).
Overall annual costs have also risen in the retail sector (including the water waste system).
Again, this evolution is due to rising levels of debt in corporate management companies
(public and private), which is contracted with significantly higher interest rates than the
bulk sector. Tariffs have consistently grown, from 1.24 €/m3 in 2005 to 1.59 €/m3 in 2012 in
water provision, and from 0.57 €/m3 in 2005 to 1.02 €/m3 in 2012 in wastewater tariffs.
Reflecting both  higher  bulk  tariffs  and the costs  of  investment  in  retail,  retail  tariffs  have
been increasing at a consistently higher rate than inflation and despite the negative
evolution of disposable income in the past few years. However, retail tariffs have grown at a
slower pace than bulk tariffs, reflecting the control over the setting of water tariffs on the
part of municipalities and their resistance to adopting cost-recovery prices.
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The  financial  conditionality  imposed  by  official  foreign  lenders  (IMF  and  EU)  is  pivotal  in
these developments, having actively pushed for the adoption of the full cost-recovery
principle. This favoured the recent endowment of the regulator ERSAR with legal powers to
impose the principle on municipalities. The recent restructuring of AdP’s multi-municipal
companies will be also instrumental in this regard. The new reorganisation of the 19
corporate bulk entities in four regional companies, North, Centre, Lisbon and South, will
facilitate implementing the full cost-recovery pricing by allowing a more gradual rise of
tariffs since the coastal (urban) regions, where current costs are lower given their high
population density, will be able to subsidise the interior, sparsely populated areas of the
country with higher costs.
This “horizontal” restructuring at the regional level is expected to be complemented by a
“reverticalisation”  of  the  retail  and  bulk  segments,  implying  the  gradual  withdrawal  of
municipalities from water provision. This is a likely scenario given the financial stress on
these municipalities. In the new context, in which the regulator ERSAR has acquired new
powers, the proposed reorganisation of the sector indicates a growing role of AdP in retail
water provision. Although this constitutes a reorganisation within the public sector, it
entails the removal of democratic deliberation traditionally guaranteed by municipalities,
directly accountable to voters, favouring instead the centralised setting of tariffs.
The public holding company AdP, even if still formally publicly owned, by gradually
integrating corporate interests and financial criteria in its management practices, has
become increasingly more suitable to privatisation. The privatisation of AdP thus seems to
be just a matter of timing, depending on the success of the “horizontal” restructuring, and
the more so as no need to target the whole company, which is not found attractive given the
need of large investment in water infrastructures and past disappointing privatisation
experiences. The reverticalisation of provision and reinforced control over the whole water
delivery process, from source to waste management, allows for other privatisation forms.
AdP  may  be  partially  privatised  –  with  private  capital  buying  a  part  of  the  company  –  or,
more probably, remain in public hands while expanding private retail concessions. That is,
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private capital can target particular parts of more mature systems where the need for new
investment is smaller and tariffs predictability higher, conforming to what the literature
has termed “cherry-picking” (Bakker, 2013).
The growing influence of private interests in water utilities is, therefore, likely to continue,
contingent on the ability of ensuring predictably stable streams of income to attract private
investors. With Portuguese firms among the most indebted of the world and with reduced
access to international debt markets, new privatisation waves will most likely involve
foreign players. And the Portuguese water sector is attractive to them as well, offering the
guarantee of stable streams of future cash flows stemming from the provision of an
essential but ever more expensive good.
At  the  moment,  the  private  companies  in  the  sector  consist  of  those  that  hold  municipal
retail concessions, covering around 13% of the population. The biggest private player,
Aquapor,  initially  part  of  the  AdP group,  was privatised in  2008 and is  now owned by  one
major Portuguese construction company DST. Indaqua, which was controlled by three
different construction companies, has now two major shareholders, the Portuguese
construction company Mota-Engil (45%) and the German financial group Talanx (50%). AGS,
formerly controlled by a consortium of Spanish and Portuguese construction companies
was sold in 2014 to Japanese conglomerates, Marubeni and INJC. The entry of private
capital in retail  concessions has also seen the entry of major multinationals,  but this was
short-lived, with Suez and Aguas de Barcelona selling Lusagua to Aquapor in 2001, and
Veolia Portugal being sold in 2014 to the Chinese group Beijing Water Systems. The latter
case is already suggestive of a new form of financialised water provision. The selling of
Veolia to Beijing Water Systems involved a sophisticated financial scheme through an
offshore company based in Bermuda that bought the retail concessions with a shareholder
loan, which will be paid back out of the cash flows the Portuguese utility will provide.
To conclude, similar to the housing and pensions case studies, the recent evolution of the
water sector exposes the semi-peripheral position of the country. The growing weight of
finance in water provision was by and large favoured by the insertion of the country in the
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European Union, which facilitated access to EU structural funding, EIB loans, and loans
from other EU banks. The high indebtedness of the country and of the water sector made
them both more vulnerable to the international economic and financial crisis. As a result,
new opportunities have arisen for a new wave of private foreign capital entry, where
financial agents started to participate as stakeholders, further promoting the concentration
and fluidity of capital in a sector traditionally rooted in specific territories and political
communities. Increasing indebtedness, financial volatility and crisis will very likely continue
to enhance the power of international financial actors over local water utilities. Thus, in
contrast to housing and pensions, and building on the transformations of the previous two
decades, the financial and economic constraints resulting from the GFC have created
favourable conditions to deepen the financialised character of the Portuguese water sector.
In tandem with what is being observed elsewhere, this may include new emerging
institutional financial investors and, with it, the growing influence of major financial centres
– London, New York, Tokyo and Frankfurt – in water provision, since they are the privileged
marketplace of the liquid and sophisticated securities markets, assisted by countless “off-
shores”. The centralisation of financial flows, on which water provision will be increasingly
dependent, will then further expose an international hierarchical structure of finance that
puts the provision of basic goods in the hands of agents hardly accountable for either
consumers or sovereign countries, thus limiting the possibility of democratic participation
in the decisions affecting how water provision is organized in the future. The
financialisation of water means deepening the connection of households with the world’s
financial centres, a connection that will be made through the payment of water bills that
will become a more relevant source of revenue for the financial sector, uniting local
consumers with global finance.
6. A vision of a financialised future in Portugal
This paper examined the future of finance in the provision of housing, pensions and water,
drawing largely on the empirical material compiled for FESSUD. The Portuguese case
studies  were brought  to  bear  on the impacts  of  finance and of  financial  crisis  on a  semi-
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peripheral country within the EU that has followed similar processes as those of the most
financialised core countries, and that has been particular hit by the GFC crisis.
Like other EU countries, finance has expanded considerably in the economy and has
penetrated various domains of social provisioning and infrastructure. The financial sector
has known what has been labelled as a process of modernisation associated with
privatisation, liberation and reregulation processes favourable to the expansion of financial
interests. Symbolising its semi-peripheral position in the EU, the most remarkable feature
of the financialisation of the Portuguese economy and society is the rise in private (in the
case of housing) and public (in the case of water) debt, channelled to the construction, the
real estate and utility sectors, and households through mortgage markets. The
unprecedented access to foreign bank loans, together with the small size of the Portuguese
semi-peripheral economy, constrained the development of capital markets more typical of
financialisation processes of core economies.
The three case studies have exposed systemic trends, namely the domination of a
neoliberal agenda promoting the expansion of markets and commodified forms of
provision, such as liberalisation of capital flows, the promotion of credit as the privileged
form of producing and accessing increasingly privatised and commodified goods, and the
corporatisation of public entities. It has exposed the semi-peripheral nature of the country
within a highly hierarchical and unequal financial system, leading to the exponential growth
of  private  debt  and  ultimately  to  a  sovereign  debt  crisis  when  the  state  could  no  longer
finance itself on international markets. The result has been a most severe economic and
financial crisis, compromising both financial and non-financial national interests, favouring
the entry of foreign capital into the country. And it has exposed the context-specific nature
of  each of  the  three systems of  provision analysed,  bringing to  the  fore  the nature of  the
goods or services provided, relevant agents, processes and history.
As the most commodified system under analysis, the evolution of housing most closely
followed that of most financialised countries, contributing to the escalation of household
indebtedness and the rise of homeownership, reproducing and amplifying social
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inequalities. As the least commodified system, pension provision is still in the domain of the
state,  with  a  relatively  small  and  highly  segmented  private  pension  market.  While  still  in
the hands of public entities, the recent corporatisation of the water sector has made it more
attractive to private and financial interests, with imminent new waves of privatisation.
Taken together, the case studies illustrates well the plasticity of finance and how it is able
to bypass context-specific hurdles (e.g. lack of financial viability of certain investments that
remain in the hands of the state), and how its influence may be exerted through more direct
or indirect ways (e.g. attractive favourable tax treatments or imposing financial principles
on management), being able to penetrate different institutional realities, private and public,
through the prerogative of capital to impose its own standards.
However, the severity of the GFC crisis in semi-peripheral countries also exposes
constraints on, and pressures for, the continued expansion of finance. Considering the role
of loanable capital in leading financialisation processes in Portugal, the prospects for the
expansion of finance are now more limited as domestic agents now have more difficulty
accessing loans. But this entails new opportunities for foreign actors in particularly
attractive segmented markets, entailing a more relevant role for foreign capital markets.
Thus, and notwithstanding all caveats that must be borne in mind in foresight exercises, we
can anticipate a qualitative change in the future of financialisation in Portugal, one less
extensive in scope but more intensive in form and content, strengthening the power of
domestic and financial elites and their hold over state policy.
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under Framework Programme 7 (contract number : 266800). The University of Leeds is the
lead co-ordinator for the research project with a budget of over 2 million euros.
THE ABSTRACT OF THE PROJECT IS:
The research programme will integrate diverse levels, methods and disciplinary traditions
with the aim of developing a comprehensive policy agenda for changing the role of the
financial system to help achieve a future which is sustainable in environmental, social and
economic terms. The programme involves an integrated and balanced consortium involving
partners from 14 countries that has unsurpassed experience of deploying diverse
perspectives both within economics and across disciplines inclusive of economics. The
programme is distinctively pluralistic, and aims to forge alliances across the social
sciences, so as to understand how finance can better serve economic, social and
environmental needs. The central issues addressed are the ways in which the growth and
performance of economies in the last 30 years have been dependent on the characteristics
of the processes of financialisation; how has financialisation impacted on the achievement
of specific economic, social, and environmental objectives?; the nature of the relationship
between financialisation and the sustainability of the financial system, economic
development and the environment?; the lessons to be drawn from the crisis about the
nature and impacts of financialisation? ; what are the requisites of a financial system able
to support a process of sustainable development, broadly conceived?’
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